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Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes 
in England and Wales
Judith Townend*
INTRODUCTION
Transparency and open data are ‘a powerful tool to help reform public services, foster 
innovation and empower citizens’, said the Prime Minister in an open letter to Cabinet 
Ministers in July 2011.1 In the same year, the Coalition Government held a consultation, 
‘Making Open Data Real’,2 to explore how it might ‘best embed a culture of openness 
and transparency in our public services’. ‘Open data’ extends to the public courts: one of 
the Government’s new commitments was to publish information about criminal justice: 
anonymised sentencing data, information about the performance of probation services 
and prisons, and national crime mapping. More recently, the Ministry of Justice set out 
an open data strategy for 2012–15, covering both civil and criminal courts.3 To some 
extent, this ‘culture of openness’ mirrors the judicial consideration given to open justice, 
which allows justice to ‘be seen to be done’4 and accountability of court proceedings.
Civil courts have been given scant attention in the Cabinet Office consultation and 
the Government’s wider open data project, despite the media and political attention 
given to civil issues, such as litigation costs and family law. In this paper, I will consider 
the ongoing public debate around defamation and privacy civil litigation and argue that 
legal researchers and other interested members of the public are in fact confronted with 
* Centre for Law, Justice and Journalism (CLJJ), City University London, UK. The author wishes to thank 
the contributors—on and offline—to the CLJJ’s ‘Open Justice in the Digital Era’ project, and in particular, 
Lucy Series, University of Exeter, with whom she worked on a joint submission to the Cabinet Office’s Open 
Data consultation, which has directly informed this article. Draft extracts of this piece have previously 
appeared online. All omissions and errors remain the author’s own. All websites accessed June 2013.
1 Prime Minister, ‘Letter to Cabinet Ministers on Transparency and Open Data’ (7 July 2011), www.
number10.gov.uk/news/letter-to-cabinet-ministers-on-transparency-and-open-data.
2 ‘Making Open Data Real: A Public Consultation’ (4 August 2011), www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-
library/making-open-data-real-public-consultation.
3 Ministry of Justice, ‘Open Data Strategy 2012–15’ (28 June 2012), www.gov.uk/government/publications/
open-data-strategy-2012-15.
4 R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
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32 Journal of Media Law
inaccessible and ‘closed’ data about public court cases when attempting to analyse the 
issues at play. Furthermore, as will be shown through an examination of various case law 
sources, the reasons for this opacity are not necessarily logical: the open justice principle 
makes the source data theoretically available, but it is not publicly accessible in a useful 
form. The data has not been deliberately closed from public view, but there appears to 
be no way for the public to access it. It is as if it is stored in a public filing cabinet with 
no drawer handles or labels. 
This is detrimental to policy-making and the legal reform process, which often relies 
on academic research and journalism during consultation stages, as is well documented 
elsewhere. For example, the independent ‘fact-checking’ organisation FullFact was partly 
born out of its director’s belief that ‘policy can be distorted by inaccurate claims’, follow-
ing his experiences as a researcher in the House of Lords.5 The organisation argued as 
part of its evidence submitted to the Leveson Inquiry6 that ‘open justice in this century 
must mean more than merely being able to walk into the courtroom’, and highlighted 
concerns about public access to sentencing remarks. The organisation was not able to 
check an ‘eye-catching claim’ made in the press about a judge’s decision in a criminal 
case.7 In its view, 
The more direct access to official sources is made easy, the greater the social pressure for good 
journalism. Moreover, having official and primary sources available online provides a founda-
tion from which assessable and trustworthy journalism can be built up. 
Similarly, this short paper argues that more direct access to official sources of data about 
libel and privacy data will improve the public debate, and the journalism and academic 
research which informs it. 
Since 2008 the national news media have taken an extensive, if fluctuating, inter-
est in libel reform and privacy-related interim injunctions, and these issues have been 
addressed by numerous committees that have taken evidence and produced reports 
relating to defamation and privacy law, including the House of Commons Culture, 
Media and Sport Select Committee, the Libel Working Group, the Joint Committee on 
the Draft Defamation Bill and the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions. The 
Judiciary has examined the issues too: a committee chaired by Lord Neuberger reported 
on ‘super-injunctions’, anonymised injunctions and open justice in May 2011, and Lord 
Justice Jackson reported on civil litigation costs in January 2010. All of these consulta-
tions lacked the necessary data for their analytical purpose, an observation made directly 
5 Will Moy, who worked for the independent member, Lord Low of Dalston. Details at http://fullfact.org/
about/team.
6 Available at www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Fourth-Submission-by-Full-Fact.
pdf.
7 A Sippitt, ‘Did a Group of Muslim Women Escape Jail for Attack Because They Were “Not Used to Alcohol”?’ 
(8 December 2011), http://fullfact.org/factcheck/Muslim_women_spared_jail_for_attack_because_not_
used_to_drinking-3179.
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33Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales 
in some reports. While there are several in-depth academic texts that cover this area of 
law,8 there are serious limitations to the case law data in the public digital domain. Some 
data is available through services run by private legal information companies and some 
is published online free of charge by law firms, but there is no centralisation of substan-
tial data by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) and the Ministry of 
Justice—to the extent that the authors of the Government’s Impact Assessment on the 
Defamation Bill 2012 felt unable to state the ‘true number’ of defamation trials in 2010, 
instead estimating a number based on data about the outcomes of proceedings in the 
Queen’s Bench overall.9 
Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the courts data—cases in court and 
claims—represent only the ‘tip of a very large iceberg’, as Eric Barendt et al identified in 
the mid-1990s in relation to publishers’ libel experiences.10 For media organisations and 
small online publishers, including social media users, the reach of libel and privacy is far 
wider than the cases that make it to court: there are unofficial warnings, letters before 
action, and of course the anticipated threat of a claim, even if it does not materialise. 
The first section of this paper considers the availability of public data around def-
amation and its role in informing the libel reform process and media coverage. The 
second section then examines privacy law and the body of data around interim privacy 
injunctions. The third section reflects on information about the costs of defamation and 
privacy litigation. In conclusion, it will be suggested that a lack of public case data about 
defamation and privacy litigation, indicated by the Impact Assessment on the Defama-
tion Bill 2012 and the report by the Master of the Rolls’ Committee on Super-Injunctions, 
hampers the policy-making process, public debate and academic research around these 
issues of public interest. The patchy data in this area is of particular concern because a 
new system of arbitration could be introduced as a result of the recommendations made 
by Lord Justice Leveson at the end of 2012, as an alternative to civil court proceedings.11 
Additionally, in the long term, it would be useful to monitor changes to litigation activity 
brought about by the new Defamation Act 2013, as suggested in the Impact Assessment 
on the Bill. 
8 See, for example, D Price QC, K Duodu and N Cain, Defamation Law: Procedure & Practice (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 4th edn 2010), which sets out a schedule of defamation trials since 1990, with the name of the 
case, the date of the trial, the outcome and brief details.
9 Impact Assessment (IA No: MOJ 145, Ministry of Justice, 1 April 2012) para 2.230, 51, www.parliament.uk/
documents/impact-assessments/IA12-009.pdf.
10 E Barendt, L Lustgarten, K Norrie and H Stephenson, Libel and the Media: The Chilling Effect (Oxford 
University Press, 1997) 41.
11 See ‘An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press Report’ (Leveson Inquiry) (November 
2012), vol 4, pt K, ch 7, 1768.
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34 Journal of Media Law
I. DEFAMATION CASES
a. Ministry of Justice Annual Statistics
Each year the Ministry of Justice publishes annual statistics on civil litigation, which 
include the outcomes of all cases in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court 
(number of all Summary Judgments, Judgment by Default, Trials, Interlocutory Appli-
cations for Master). These outcomes may not necessarily relate to the number of new 
claims issued: they could include hearings of claims from one or more years previously. 
With regard to defamation cases specifically, we are told that the total number of claims 
issued in each claim value bracket (£15,000–£50,000 or over £50,000 or Unspecified), 
but not given a breakdown of outcomes, beyond the overall figures.12 As a result, an 
official number of defamation trials is not recorded. Jaron Lewis, who until recently led 
Reynolds Porter Chamberlain’s media group, has compiled a table of these statistics for 
1990–2011.13 
These figures suggest that of the claims that make it to court, only a fraction have a 
reported outcome. For example, the Ministry of Justice reported 165 defamation claims 
during the calendar year 2011, but a manual search of cases suggests that there were only 
around 23 defamation cases that reached summary judgment or full trial in the same 
time period, not including appeals that completed cases.14 
b. Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill
The Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill, given an ‘amber’ rating by the Regu-
latory Policy Committee, assessed the societal and economic costs and benefits of the 
proposed reforms.15 On the whole, the Ministry of Justice was unable to ‘sensibly’ mon-
etise the impacts, as it might have done for a different type of bill, ‘in part due to a lack 
of robust baseline data’. It did not have ‘the necessary data and evidence to make quan-
titative predictions of how relevant variables would change compared to the baseline in 
future’.16 This was partly because it could not acquire the information from the parties 
involved in defamation cases, but it was also not able to access the necessary courts data. 
For example, its figures on defamation litigation rely on the Ministry of Justice’s annual 
12 For 2011, this was: £15,000–£50,000, 28; Over £50,000, 61; Unspecified, 76; Total, 165. Ministry of Justice, 
‘Judicial and Court Statistics (Annual)’, www.gov.uk/government/publications/judicial-and-court- 
statistics-annual.
13 Contained in ‘Judicial Statistics 2011: Number of Defamation Claims Remains Low’, Inforrm’s Blog (7 July 
2012), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/07/15/judicial-statistics-2011-number-of-defamation-claims-
remains-low.
14 ‘Defamation Trials, Summary Determinations and Assessments in 2011’, Inforrm’s Blog (11 January 
2012), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/01/11/defamation-trials-summary-determinations-and-assess 
ments-in-2011.
15 Impact Assessment (MOJ 145, 2012).
16 Ibid, para 2.2, p 24.
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35Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales 
statistics, which, as outlined above, contain only very basic facts about defamation: the 
number of claims issued, categorised in three value brackets. 
The Impact Assessment noted that ‘[t]here is no official collection of figures relat-
ing to the number of defamation cases that reach full trial or on the number of pre-trial 
hearings in defamation cases’, and that ‘[d]ata are not collated centrally on the outcomes 
of defamation claims issued in court’. In addition, it had ‘no reliable data on the number 
or outcome of cases that do not reach court, including damages and costs paid’. It was 
not able to obtain ‘information on the amount spent by media organisations and oth-
ers on legal advice to help them make decisions about whether to publish, challenge or 
defend a challenge’.17 
In order to estimate the outcomes of defamation cases in 2010, the Ministry of Jus-
tice appears to have calculated 3.25 per cent of the outcomes of total cases in the Queen’s 
Bench Division, to arrive at figures specifically relating to defamation (known to account 
for 3.25 per cent of all Queen’s Bench cases in 2010). Its table suggests that there would 
have been nine summary judgments and six trials concluded if the 158 defamation 
claims were similar to all 4,864 claims in the Queen’s Bench Division.
Volume in 2010
Claims 
issued
Judgment by 
default
Summary 
judgment
Trials 
concluded 
Interlocutory 
applications for 
Masters
All claims 
in RCJ
4,864 1,190 269 182 8,113 
Defama-
tion claims
158 39 9 6 264
If similar to all claims
Claims issued in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court at the Royal Courts of Justice. Source: Judicial and 
Court Statistics (2010), Ministry of Justice.18
But these are not the actual outcomes; an important disclaimer is given: the figures 
only apply ‘if similar to all claims’. The document does state, however, that the evidence 
collected from its analysis of a sample of 145 case files ‘would seem to support these 
assumptions, particularly on the number of trials concluded’.19 This sample data also 
comes with a disclaimer: ‘As not all case files are completed consistently, these data should 
17 Ibid, paras 2.17–2.23, p 27.
18 Ibid, para 2.56, p 32. 
19 Ibid.
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36 Journal of Media Law
be treated as approximate only.’20 It gives details of 331 defamation cases identified as 
having been issued at the Royal Courts of Justice over the period 1 October 2009—7 
November 2011 (not including any cases issued at District Registries). In conclusion, 
the document states: ‘[W]e would expect fewer than 10 defamation trials a year in total 
… Though the true number may be higher than 10, with only 158 defamation claims 
issued in total in 2010 it is considered unlikely to be much higher.’21 In other words, the 
Ministry of Justice estimated the number of trials because no central records are kept. 
A manual search suggests that there were, in fact, three completed full defamation trials 
that resulted in judgments in 2010.22
Furthermore, the Defamation Bill Impact Assessment tentatively noted: ‘It appears 
there are very few jury trials at all, and no systematic data is collected.’ Unofficially, it is 
widely known among media law researchers and practitioners that the first libel jury trial 
in nearly three years took place in June 2011.23 Lord Lester, for example, told the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill in April 2011 that he ‘believe[d] that there has 
been no jury trial in a libel case in the last 18 months’,24 although this information is not 
officially recorded by the Ministry of Justice. 
The Impact Assessment also contains a useful nine-point methodology for establish-
ing baseline data with which to ‘monetise the impacts of each of the proposals’.25 This 
baseline data could have been compared with post-reform data (once the provisions of 
the Defamation Act 2013 come into force), in order to assess the impact of the legislative 
changes. This cannot be done because ‘comprehensive (or reliably representative) data 
[is] available for very few of these factors’.26 In the absence of more extensive data, it 
would be impossible to conduct this comparative exercise. 
c. The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
The Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee identified a data problem in its report 
on libel, privacy and press standards, published in February 2010. With regard to ‘libel 
tourism’ it said: ‘During the course of our inquiry we asked for information on the 
number of cases challenged on the grounds of jurisdiction and the success rate of such 
challenges. We have been provided with no such information and it was not clear who 
would be responsible for collecting it.’27 As a result, it recommended as follows:
20 Ibid, para 2.58, p 32.
21 Ibid, para 2.230, p 51.
22 Inforrm’s Blog (n 14). 
23 Cooper v Evening Standard and Associated Newspapers (2012) (not yet reported).
24 Lord Lester, Oral Evidence to Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, Oral and Associated Written 
Evidence, Volume II (HL Paper 203 & HC 930-II, 27 April 2011), Qs 1–40, 41. 
25 Impact Assessment (MOJ 145, 2012) para 2.14, p 26.
26 Ibid, para 2.15, p 26.
27 House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Second 
Report of Session 2009–10 (24 February 2010), para 207.
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37Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales 
[T]he Ministry of Justice and the Courts Service should as a priority agree a basis for the col-
lection of statistics relating to jurisdictional matters, including claims admitted and denied, 
successful and unsuccessful appeals made to High Court judges and cases handled by an indi-
vidual judge. We further recommend that such information be collated for the period since 
the House of Lords judgment in the Berezovsky case in May 2000 and is published to inform 
debate and policy options in this area of growing concern.28 
d. The Libel Working Group
The Libel Working Group’s report, published in 2010, includes an Annex compiled by 
the Ministry of Justice summarising 219 unspecified defamation cases issued in the 
High Court in 2009.29 Of those, 34 were identified as having a ‘foreign connection’. This 
figure differs from the Ministry of Justice’s reported number of claims issued in 2009, 
which was 298, and it sets out six reasons why the data ‘needs to be treated with caution’, 
emphasising that the data provides ‘a snapshot of cases from one year only’ and that it 
does not ‘attempt to give a conclusive picture of the place of domicile of the parties’. 
Annex C30 gives a list of ‘libel tourism’ cases raised by members of the Working Group, 
with a footnoted disclaimer that the committee ‘recognise[s] that “libel tourism” is a 
controversial concept’. 
In the absence of a centralised source of information, many of the reports cite 
each other’s statistics. For example, figures given by Lord Justice Jackson regarding the 
number of jury trials31 were used in the report by the Ministry of Justice’s Libel Work-
ing Group and subsequently repeated in the Impact Assessment;32 this is the claim that 
‘fewer libel cases are now being heard with a jury rather than by a judge alone’, with four 
of each in 2008 and four jury trials and nine by judge alone up until November 2009.33
e. Sweet & Maxwell reports 
Each year the legal publisher Sweet & Maxwell releases statistics on the number of 
defamation cases in court—not claims issued—for the year ending 31 May, and gives 
additional details about the types of claimants and defendants in a press release. There are 
limitations to the publishers’ data and accompanying analysis.34 The latest press release 
opened ‘Phone hacking scandal leads to lower media appetite for libel risk’, prompt-
28 Ibid, para 208. 
29 Ministry of Justice, Report of the Libel Working Group (23 March 2010), Annex B, 45.
30 Ibid, Annex C, 52.
31 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO, December 2009) para 6.2, p 328.
32 Impact Assessment (MOJ 145, 2012), para 2.231, p 51.
33 Report of the Libel Working Group (n 29) 85.
34 See criticisms raised on Inforrm’s blog, for example: ‘Misreporting Defamation Research: No “Drop 
in Cases” and No Leveson Effect’ (4 September 2012), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/09/04/
misreporting-defamation-research-no-drop-in-cases-and-no-leveson-effect.
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38 Journal of Media Law
ing various media reports that attributed a post-Leveson effect. However, as explained 
above, the cases in the courts over a 12-month period may not match the claims issued 
in the same 12-month period; they may well have been issued well before the crescendo 
of the phone hacking scandal, or the beginning of the Leveson Inquiry. 
It would be useful if the publisher supplied more details about the provenance of the 
data, such as the case names and methodology of categorisation. This would help read-
ers and researchers analyse factors affecting litigation, and any significant changes, for 
themselves. Of course, as a private company, Sweet & Maxwell is under no public service 
obligation to provide these reports, so it would be even better if the courts provided this 
information at source.
The Sweet & Maxwell data is significant—and therefore included here—because it 
has influenced public and media debate, perhaps more than any other public source of 
defamation data. As an illustration, on 12 June and 12 September 2012 David Morris MP 
argued in the House of Commons35 that ‘“libel tourism” has been a burden on our civil 
legal system’, citing the textbook Media and Entertainment Law:36
In September 2010 the Daily Telegraph reported that libel challenges by actors and celebrities 
in the London courts had trebled over the past year.
This would appear to refer to a report headlined ‘Libel challenges by actors and sport 
stars treble in year’, which was based on ‘figures from the legal information provider 
Sweet & Maxwell’.37 In the absence of fuller data, it is difficult to ascertain the founda-
tion of the statement, or the level and type of ‘libel tourism’ in the courts—an exercise 
that is not attempted for the purposes of this article. More data at source would allow us 
to check public statements such as these, which may have a bearing on future policy and 
statute. Researchers would then be able to make more informed analyses of the features 
of libel law, such as the number of corporations making claims, or the nature of claims 
involving claimants and defendants based outside England and Wales. It would have 
allowed the Libel Working Group to look at more than a ‘snapshot’ of case data. 
f. Criminal Libel 
This final section completes the inventory of defamation data sources. The criminal 
offences of defamatory, seditious and obscene libel were abolished as part of section 
73 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which came into effect from January 2010. 
Blasphemous libel was abolished the year before, under the Criminal Justice and Immi-
gration Act 2008. Curiously, a number of ‘libel’ offences have been recorded in Home 
35 HC Deb, 12 June 2012, col 202; HC Deb, 12 September 2012, col 371. 
36 U Smartt, Media and Entertainment Law (Routledge, 2011).
37 ‘Libel Challenges by Actors and Sport Stars Treble in Year’ (3 September 2010), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/law-and-order/7978156/Libel-challenges-by-actors-and-sport-stars-treble-in-year.html.
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39Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales 
Office statistics since January 2010: four in 2010/11 and one in 2011/12.38 A spokesper-
son from the Home Office confirmed:
Suffolk [Police] have reviewed the four libel offences recorded in 2010/11 and have now 
‘reclassified’ these to non-notifiable offences of Malicious Communication. South Wales have 
confirmed that they did record an offence in 2011/12 as it still appeared in the Home Office 
Counting Rules39 but have not indicated whether this was in error.40
II. PRIVACY CASES
a. Master of the Rolls’ Committee on Super-Injunctions 
In 2010, the Master of the Rolls recommended that the Ministry of Justice, with the 
assistance of HMCTS, ‘should collect data about super-injunctions and anonymised 
injunctions, in relation to all privacy orders which derogate from the principles of 
freedom of expression’. This was following ‘growing public concerns about the use and 
effect of what were termed super-injunctions and the impact they were having on open 
justice’.41 There had been a frenzy of media reporting around super-injunctions, both 
prior to the committee’s formation and during its meeting period.42 The final report 
drew attention to incorrect use of the term ‘super-injunction’,43 but also acknowledged 
an absence of official data.44 The absence of recorded data was such that Lord Neuberger 
was unable to tell journalists precisely how many so-called super injunctions and ano-
nymised privacy injunctions—by the report’s own definitions—had been granted since 
2000.45 According to the report, specific records were not ‘kept in respect of such mat-
38 Home Office, Crimes Detected in England and Wales 2010/11, www.gov.uk/government/publications/
crimes-detected-in-england-and-wales-2010-to-2011; 2011/12, www.gov.uk/government/publications/
crimes-detected-in-england-and-wales-2011-to-2012.
39 Home Office, Counting Rules (30 March 2012), section 99, www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-
research-statistics/research-statistics/crime-research/counting-rules/count-other?view=Binary (no longer 
available). 
40 Email communication with author.
41 Master of the Rolls, ‘Committee Reports Findings on “Super-Injunctions”’, press release (20 May 2011), www.
judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/2011/committee-reports-findings-super-injunctions-20052011.
42 See J Townend, ‘Lord Neuberger’s Report Cuts through the Superinjunction Hysteria’ (20 May 2011), www.
guardian.co.uk/law/2011/may/20/lord-neuberger-report-superinjunction-hysteria.
43 According to the report, ‘[t]he term super-injunction is frequently used incorrectly to refer to an anony-
mised injunction’. Master of the Rolls, Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions: Super-Injunctions, 
Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (20 May 2011), para 2.15, p 20.
44 Ibid, para 4.4, p 54.
45 Press conference held by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and the Master of the Rolls (20 May 
2011), transcript available at www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/110520-superinjunctions-
transcript.pdf.
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ters’.46 The committee’s recommendations sought to prevent that type of data blackout 
occurring again and suggested that the Ministry of Justice’s Chief Statistician should, 
with HMCTS, ‘examine the feasibility of introducing a data collection system for all 
interim non-disclosure orders, including super-injunctions and anonymised injunc-
tions’.47
In relation to issues around courts’ communication with parliament, it said that the 
Ministry of Justice, HMCTS and the House authorities ‘should consider the feasibility 
of a streamlined system for answering sub judice queries from the Speakers’ offices’. This 
would involve ‘the creation of a secure database containing details of super-injunctions 
and anonymised injunctions held by HMCTS, which could be easily searchable follow-
ing any query from the House authorities’.48 
The Ministry of Justice has released three privacy injunction data bulletins since 
then, reporting that there were three proceedings where the High Court in London 
considered an application for a new interim injunction prohibiting the publication of 
private or confidential information between July and December 2012.49 These figures 
are not matched to any specific cases. It would be useful to researchers if the cases with a 
public judgment were identified. These data provisions were made permanent by inclu-
sion in the Civil Procedure Rules with effect from 1 October 2012. 
b. Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions
The Joint Committee ‘strongly welcome[d] the arrangements made by the Master of the 
Rolls to monitor and publish figures on the number of anonymised and super-injunc-
tions granted and the circumstances in which they are granted’,50 and recommended 
that super-injunctions and anonymised injunctions that were granted before the Master 
of the Rolls’ committee’s report and are still in force ‘are reviewed by the courts to ensure 
they are still necessary and are compatible with that committee’s conclusions on open 
justice’. Once reviewed, figures on them should be published.51
46 Report of the Committee on Super-Injunctions (20 May 2011), para 4.2, p 53.
47 Ibid, vi.
48 Ibid, vi–vii. According to the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, ‘[d]iscussions are under way 
about creating such a system’: Session 2010–12 Report (HL Paper 273 HC 1443, TSO, 12 March 2012), para 
228, 50.
49 Latest bulletin (Ministry of Justice, 14 March 2013) at www.gov.uk/government/publications/statistics-on-
privacy-injunctions--2. 
50 House of Commons/House of Lords Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, Session 2010–12 Report 
(HL Paper 273 HC 1443, TSO, 12 March 2012), para 64, p 22.
51 Ibid, para 65, p 23.
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c. Public Judgments
The Master of the Rolls’ report also suggested that—in line with the recommendation in 
JIH v News Group Newspapers—‘judgments and orders containing derogations from the 
principle of open justice are made publicly available’.52 It suggested that ‘an anonymised 
injunction is a less extensive derogation from open justice, as the proceedings and judg-
ments, subject to necessary redactions, remain in public view’.53
Gideon Benaim has since raised a concern that ‘allowing the publication of the fact 
that an injunction has been granted, together with basic facts about the specific case … 
creates publicity and hysteria about who the person seeking the injunction is, and also 
encourages online speculation fuelled by those in the know’.54 In his view, transpar-
ency issues ‘can be dealt with easily by a periodic release of statistical information on 
the number of injunctions, the type of injunction, the sex of the claimant and the type 
of subject matter (whether medical, sex, child etc)’. These releases could also include 
information ‘such as whether there was a media defendant, whether the public interest 
was argued, and whether the claimant was a politician, businessperson or some other 
well-known person’. He argues: 
It isn’t necessary to publish information about specific cases contemporaneously, nor to pub-
lish to the world at large at any time the ‘not so basic’ details of a specific case, in the way that 
the courts have started to do. The Practice Direction can be amended to oblige practitioners 
to provide the required basic information to a central office in the High Court. Transparency 
is possible through statistics without needing to draw attention to individuals at the time they 
obtain the injunction.55
While Benaim’s proposal sounds sensible, there are associated problems to tease out. 
For example, he contends: ‘In reality the media never made an application to discharge 
a “super-injunction”—despite the fact that they were fully aware of their terms (having 
been served with each one)’. But how does he—and researchers—definitively know that 
in the absence of data before mid-2011? Since the judiciary does not even know how 
many ‘super-injunctions’ (as defined in Lord Neuberger’s report) there were, or the basic 
details of them, it is difficult to verify that fact at source. Instead, researchers rely on law-
yers or members of the media sharing details that are difficult or impossible to check at 
the courts. It seems likely that information does come out this way, but it is a fallible and 
inadequate means of accountability. 
52 Report of the Committee on Super Injunctions (2011), para 4.8, p 55.
53 Ibid, para 2.26, p 24.
54 G Benaim, ‘Privacy Protection: Have the Courts been Led Astray?’ (6 September 2012), www.guardian.
co.uk/media/2012/sep/06/privacy-protection.
55 Ibid.
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III. COSTS
a. Jackson Report
General data on defamation costs was included in Appendix 17 of the Jackson Prelimi-
nary Report,56 which has been used to inform subsequent reports and debate. It sets out 
the anonymised details of 154 libel and privacy claims resolved in 2008 involving nine 
national newspaper groups, broadcasters and news agencies as well as local newspaper 
publishers, as compiled by the Media Lawyers Association, which is formed of in-house 
media lawyers from newspapers, magazines, book publishers, broadcasters and news 
agencies. This included 137 claims for libel, 15 claims for breach of privacy and two 
combined claims for both libel and breach of privacy. Details include the Result; Defend-
ants’ costs; Sums paid to Claimant; and whether a Conditional Fee Agreement (CFA) was 
used. The Final Report analyses and summarises this data in new tables.57
When asked about the number of CFA cases that had been won by claimants, Jack-
son LJ told the CMS Committee in May 2009 that there was a limit to the evidence he 
was able to collect:
It appears, from the evidence which I have received, that claimants are successful in a very high 
percentage of defamation cases. The evidence which has been supplied to me does not enable 
me to give you a precise percentage; it is something I would have been delighted to receive, 
but none of the parties on either side of this particular divide has furnished me with evidence 
which enables me to confirm or contradict the 98%. I would be surprised if it is that high, but 
it is certainly a high percentage.58
When asked about data from previous years, he said:
I am afraid I do not have data from previous years. Obviously, it would be helpful if I did 
have. This [preliminary] report has been prepared in the space of four months and defama-
tion litigation is actually a very small part of the total subject and there are a huge number of 
appendices dealing with costs in all sorts of areas. I took the view that the contemporaneous 
evidence is the most helpful, and my appendices give a snapshot of costs being incurred at 
about the present time.59
Like the writers of the Impact Assessment, Jackson LJ was unable to acquire the necessary 
data from the parties, and compromised with an anonymised ‘snapshot of costs’ in the 
56 Lord Justice Jackson, Preliminary Report: Civil Litigation Costs Review (1 May 2009), appendix 17, www.
judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2fDocuments%2fGuidance%2fapp17.pdf.
57 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (TSO, December 2009) ch 2 [7] (p 23); 
appendix 1, 515.
58 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel, Qs 918–74 
(19 May 2009), para 213.
59 Ibid, para 216.
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MLA Appendix, which has since been criticised by David Howarth for its ‘skewed’ data.60 
Howarth takes issue with the widely accepted belief that libel costs are too high, dis-
secting both the Jackson appendix and a study published by the Centre for Socio-Legal 
Studies in Oxford in December 2008, arguing that ‘[t]here is no evidence that libel costs 
“regularly reach hundreds of thousands of pounds” or that they are “out of control”’.61 
In turn, Howarth’s own statistical analysis has been questioned by Helen Anthony, who 
suggests that he paints an ‘artificial picture’.62 While it is outside the scope of this article 
to assess the various claims made about costs, its findings support Howarth’s obser-
vation that ‘the reality is that we know little about the costs of libel cases’.63 His final 
conclusion urges ‘a fervent search for reliable evidence’:64 a commendable suggestion, 
but one that is easier said than done when legal researchers are faced with the same 
barriers as the Ministry of Justice in its Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill: an 
absence of official collated statistics and detailed evidence from the parties involved in 
defamation and privacy litigation. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has identified large gaps in information concerning the number and type 
of privacy and defamation cases, and has attempted to set out some of the contribu-
tory reasons for this ‘closed data’. Similarly, David Howarth identified an absence of data 
on defamation costs—a point which can also be extended to data on privacy costs. As 
indicated by a number of recent reports—some partly instigated by a short supply of 
data—there is widespread concern about the lack of evidence in this field, which has 
an effect on related procedural and statutory legal reform. ‘Closed data’ on defamation 
and privacy litigation, indicated by the Impact Assessment on the Defamation Bill 2012 
and the report by the Master of the Rolls’ Committee on Super-Injunctions, damages 
the policy-making process, public debate and academic research around these issues of 
public interest. This is particularly significant as policy-makers attempt to devise mecha-
nisms around Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendations for a new arbitration service to 
resolve civil complaints.65 Furthermore, without changes to the way data is collected and 
60 D Howarth, ‘The Cost of Libel Actions: A Sceptical Note’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal 397. See also R 
Moorhead, ‘Are Libel Costs 150 Times Greater in England and Wales?’, Lawyer Watch blog (29 May 2012), 
http://lawyerwatch.wordpress.com/2012/05/29/are-libel-costs-150-times-greater-in-england-and-wales.
61 Ibid, 419.
62 H Anthony, ‘Alternative Libel Project Report: Costs, ADR and Leveson’, Inforrm’s Blog (3 April 2012), 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/04/03/alternative-libel-project-report-costs-adr-and-leveson-helen-
anthony.
63 Howarth (n 60) 397.
64 Ibid, 419.
65 At the time of writing, both the Government’s Draft Royal Charter and a charter drafted by a group of 
newspaper publishers contained varying provisions for a new arbitration service.
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collated, it will be impossible to monitor the effect that the new Defamation Act 2013 has 
on litigation activity, once its provisions are in force. 
The various concerns of and recommendations made by the committees discussed 
above need to be taken seriously by Government as part of its open data initiative, which 
should not only focus on criminal law. Data on civil litigation, costs, type and detail of 
cases also needs to be carefully monitored and made available to the legal profession, 
journalists and researchers, as well as the wider public, in a cost-efficient and practical 
way. This heightened accountability should not impede the courts’ administration of 
justice66 but will ensure, for example, that members of the public are able to easily access 
an official figure concerning the number of libel trials that have taken place, rather than 
an estimate or supposed number. As it stands, we know very little information about the 
very tip of the defamation and privacy iceberg.
66 Cf the Lord Chief Justice’s comments about cameras in court at his annual press conference, 27 September 
2012, transcript available at www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/2012/lcj-press-conference-2012. 
He said: ‘[A]ny further changes to the system will have to be examined with only one single criterion in 
mind, and that is whether by letting the cameras into that part of the process, the administration of justice 
is likely to suffer.’
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